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Do voluntary disclosures of product and business expansion plans 
impact analyst coverage and forecasts? 
 
Abstract: We investigate whether voluntary disclosures of product and business expansion 
plans affect analyst coverage and forecasts. We find that the level of analyst coverage is 
positively associated with the incidence of disclosures of product and business expansion plans. 
We also find that product and business expansion disclosures increase the informativeness of 
analyst earnings forecasts. We find no evidence that product and business expansion 
disclosures increase analyst forecast errors. Overall, our study contributes to understanding the 
role of product and business expansion disclosures in analyst forecast behaviour. 
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1 Introduction 
Financial analysts play an important role in the financial marketplace; they provide 
earnings forecasts and stock recommendations to investors. In fulfilling this role, analysts rely 
on a variety of information involving both financial and nonfinancial disclosures made by firms 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2012). The importance of financial information in equity valuation is well 
established (e.g., Holthausen and Watts 2001). Nonetheless, such information might become 
less value-relevant compared with nonfinancial information (Amir and Lev 1996, Francis and 
Schipper 1999, Rajgopal et al. 2003, Dontoh et al. 2004). The reasons include globalisation, 
technological revolution, transition to knowledge economies, financial crises, and/or the rapid 
growth in socially responsible investments (Orens and Lybaert 2013), all of which raise the 
potential value relevance of corporate nonfinancial information disclosures.  
Various nonfinancial information disclosures are potentially value-relevant. Most such 
disclosures are made on a voluntary basis, covering issues such as corporate social 
responsibility (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2011, Dhaliwal et al. 2012, Cormier and Magnan 2014), 
corporate environmental policies (e.g., Beets and Souther 1999, Aerts et al. 2008), customer 
relationship (e.g., Luo et al. 2010, Ngobo et al. 2012), intellectual capital (e.g., Hsu and Chang 
2011), research and development expenditures (e.g., Barron et al. 2002, Jones 2007, Xu et al. 
2007), and product and business expansion plans (e.g., Nichols 2010, He 2018). Evidence 
suggests that corporate nonfinancial disclosures can affect analyst forecast decisions (e.g., 
Lang and Lundholm 1996, Aerts et al. 2008, Simpson 2010). Product and business expansion 
plan disclosures appear particularly pertinent. The reasons are two-fold. First, firms typically 
have product and business expansion plans, with the announcement of such plans occurring 
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often in practice. Second, product and business expansion plans are key input information in 
strategy analysis that is crucial for forecasts and valuations (Wahlen et al. 2014, Peek et al. 
2016). Thus, these plans should have an impact on analyst research. Despite this, little research 
attention has been paid to understanding the impact of product and business expansion 
(hereafters, PBE) disclosures on analyst research activities. We seek to fill this void in the 
literature. We investigate whether and how nonfinancial disclosures of PBE plans affect analyst 
coverage and forecasts.  
Nonfinancial disclosures of PBE plans are increasingly used by firms to convey 
information to market participants. Nichols (2010) documents that PBE disclosures have 
implications to market participants for long-term streams of future earnings and are thus value-
relevant.1 To the extent that PBE disclosures enrich the information available to analysts and 
resolve the perceived uncertainty associated with PBE activities, analysts should be able to 
generate accurate and consensus forecasts at lower information acquisition and/or processing 
costs. Further, on account of the important role of forecast accuracy in determining analysts’ 
compensation and career developments, analysts should have a stronger incentive to follow 
firms with more PBE disclosures so as to secure forecast accuracy. Prior studies show that 
analysts in general are more efficient in processing nonfinancial information compared to 
investors. To the extent that analysts do a better job than investors in extrapolating the 
implications of PBE disclosures for future earnings, additional PBE disclosures should increase 
investor demand for analyst services, thereby attracting more analyst coverage. Therefore, we 
                                                             
1 The PBE disclosure itself facilitates outsiders' learning over a firm's fundamentals and performance, and 
thereby helps outsiders infer future earnings and make better forecasts and valuations. Put differently, though 
a disclosure per se has no impact on a firm's future earnings, but it could have an impact on the way outsiders 
interpret a firm's performance and form expectation about a firm's future earnings.  
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predict a positive association between PBE disclosures and analyst coverage. 
Our empirical tests cover the period of 2002-2012.2 To control for potential sample 
selection bias, we use a propensity-score-matching approach to construct a sample of control 
observations that do not have PBE disclosures. These observations are matched with the 
treatment observations that have PBE disclosures. The sample used for the main analysis 
consists of both the treatment and control samples, which total 3,812 firm-year observations. 
Consistent with our predictions, we find that analyst coverage is positively associated with 
nonfinancial disclosures of product and business expansion plans.  
Voluntary disclosures and analyst coverage might be endogenously determined (Lang and 
Lundholm 1996), and this concern also applies to our research context. Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg. FD), introduced in 2000, prohibits firms from selectively releasing private 
information to financial analysts. Because our sample period falls within the post Reg. FD 
period, the concern that PBE disclosures and analyst coverage are endogenously determined 
by private information is reduced. To further address potential endogeneity issues, we also 
undertake the following. First, we measure analyst coverage in a period lagged by PBE 
disclosures, and we include an extensive list of control variables that are likely related to both 
analyst coverage and PBE disclosures. Second, we apply a firm-fixed-effects regression model. 
Third, we use a two-stage-instrumental-variables specification in which three proxies for 
proprietary costs of disclosures as per Karuna (2007) are used as instrumental variables. 
Proprietary costs are expected to be positively correlated with the incidence of PBE disclosures 
                                                             
2 We end our sample period in year 2012 because of the data availability on PBE disclosures. 
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but have little direct impact on analyst coverage, thus satisfying the condition of being a valid 
instrument. Our results are robust to using all three approaches to address endogeneity concerns.  
We also examine whether PBE disclosures impact the informativeness of analyst earnings 
forecasts. Following Frankel et al. (2006), we measure analyst forecast informativeness by the 
three-day cumulative abnormal stock returns surrounding analyst forecast dates. PBE 
disclosures could add value to analyst reports and make analyst forecasts more informative on 
condition that: (i) the information disclosed is value-relevant; and (ii) analysts are perceived 
by investors to be more efficient in processing PBE information and in inferring its implications 
for future earnings, thereby rendering analyst forecasts more informative to investors. If both 
conditions hold, we expect to find a positive association between PBE disclosures and analyst 
forecast informativeness. Our results support this prediction, which is consistent with and 
complements two strands of literature which shows that (i) PBE disclosures are value-relevant 
(Nichols 2010; He 2018) and that (ii) analysts are more sophisticated than investors in 
processing information (e.g., Chandra et al. 1999, Rajgopal et al. 2003). We do not find 
evidence that additional disclosures of PBE information increase or decrease analyst forecast 
errors. We interpret this as suggesting that absent a PBE disclosure, analysts are inclined to 
expend more efforts and costs in acquiring and processing information that is necessary for 
securing forecast accuracy, and that disclosure of PBE plans helps analysts save on such efforts 
and costs. Finally, our additional tests reveal that our main results for the effect of PBE 
disclosures on analyst coverage and forecasts are amenable to (i) using a coarsened-exact-
matching technique to form our sample for the hypothesis tests and (ii) clustering the standard 
errors of the coefficients by industry when estimating the regressions.  
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Our study contributes to the literature in several respects. First, notwithstanding that PBE 
disclosures are value-relevant and occur frequently in practice as a vehicle for firms to convey 
information to market participants, few papers consider whether and how such disclosures 
influence analyst decisions. Our study fills this gap by being the first to provide evidence on 
the impact of PBE disclosures on analyst coverage. We argue for a positive link between PBE 
disclosures and analyst coverage from the perspectives of both the supply of and demand for 
analyst services, and our empirical results confirm our conjectures.  
Second, our study is the first to link nonfinancial disclosures, particularly PBE disclosures, 
with analyst forecast informativeness, the latter of which is measured by stock market reaction 
to analyst earnings forecasts. Our finding that PBE disclosures increase market reaction to 
analyst forecasts suggests that analysts are perceived by investors as being better able to 
comprehend the implications of PBE disclosures for future earnings. As such, our study 
complements the extant view (e.g., Chandra et al. 1999, Rajgopal et al. 2003) that analysts are 
generally more efficient in processing information than investors, and that analyst are serving 
an active role in promoting informational efficiency in financial markets.3   
Third, the impact of voluntary disclosures on analyst forecast accuracy has been examined, 
with evidence (e.g., Waymire 1986, Hassell et al. 1988, Lang and Lundholm 1996, Williams 
1996) suggesting that value-relevant voluntary disclosures increase forecast accuracy. The 
presumption underlying this research is that the absence of additional value-relevant 
disclosures would not prompt analysts to engage more in their valuation research to mitigate 
the adverse impact of fewer value-relevant disclosures on analyst forecast accuracy. However, 
                                                             
3 Analysts’ role in contributing to stock price efficiency is still a debatable issue in the literature. See Frankel 
et al. (2006), for example, for the detailed review over this literature.  
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this presumption is not necessarily true for some disclosures that are crucial to forecasting by 
analysts. Unlike prior literature, we examine PBE disclosures that have strong implications for 
future earnings. We find no evidence that such disclosures significantly improve forecast 
accuracy. This is consistent with the notion that without PBE disclosures made by firms, 
analysts tend to incur more efforts and costs in their research to maintain forecast accuracy. 
Our study hence offers insight that additional value-relevant disclosures and analyst efforts in 
information acquisition/processing may act as substitutes in contributing to the accuracy of 
analyst forecasts. 
Last but not least, extant research (e.g., Barth et al. 2001, Vanstraelen et al. 2003, Simpson 
2010) on the association of analyst coverage and forecasts with nonfinancial disclosures 
examines disclosures regarding intangible assets, customer acquisition costs, web traffic 
growth, etc, of firms in a relatively narrow scope of industries, typically, high-tech industries. 
By contrast, our study examines the disclosure as to product and business expansion which 
prevail among firms in a range of industries. Moreover, PBE activities play an important role 
in firm business development and have substantive impact on firm performance, thus analysis 
of PBE disclosures is crucial in the valuation process. As such, it is worthy of an investigation 
as to whether PBE disclosures influence analyst coverage and forecasts.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data source and sample. Section 4 explains the research 
design. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 presents the additional 
analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
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2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
     In this section, we first illuminate the value relevance of voluntary PBE disclosures. We 
then develop our main hypothesis regarding the relationship between analyst coverage and 
voluntary PBE disclosures. Following this, we develop supplemental hypotheses as to whether 
voluntary PBE disclosures are related to the informativeness of, and errors in, analyst earnings 
forecasts.  
 
2.1 Value relevance of voluntary PBE disclosures 
Product-related plans relate to the disclosures of information pertaining to the introduction, 
change, modification, and/or discontinuation of a company’s products or services. Business 
expansion plans concern a proposed increase in current operations through internal growth. 
Business expansion plans may involve, for instance, entering into new markets with existing 
products, opening a new branch, establishing a new division, increasing production capacity, 
and/or investing additional capital in the current business; such plans are exclusive of growth 
by merger and acquisition.4 Appendix III gives examples of firms’ product and business 
expansion plans. Voluntary disclosures of such business plans tend to occur via press releases 
or news outlets. PBE plans have strong implications to outsiders for a firm’s long-term stream 
of future earnings and cash flow and are thus value-relevant. Consistent with this view, Nichols 
(2010) finds that disclosures of PBE plans generate significant positive stock market reactions 
of 30-60 basis points on average. Prior studies (e.g., Brown et al. 1987, Hong and Kubik 2003, 
Leone and Wu 2007) find that analysts have incentives to gather as much value-relevant 
                                                             
4 The definitions of the product and business expansion plan disclosures follow Capital IQ’s definitions. 
Capital IQ is a division of Standard and Poor’s. 
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information as possible for their forecasts and valuations. Therefore, a PBE disclosure, given 
its value-relevance nature, should have an impact upon analysts’ decision-making. 
 
2.2 The impact of PBE disclosures on analyst coverage 
The number of analysts that follow a given firm is driven by the demand for and supply 
of analyst services. This model as to the determinants of analyst coverage was initially 
proposed by Bhushan (1989) and has been used in empirical studies (see, e.g., Lang and 
Lundholm 1996, Frankel et al. 2006). We establish a theoretical link between PBE disclosures 
and analyst coverage by discussing the role PBE disclosures play in the demand- and supply- 
curve for analyst services.   
From the supply-curve perspective, to the extent that the cost of analysts receiving 
information from firms is lower than the cost of acquiring information independently from 
other sources, increased disclosures should increase the supply of analyst services (Lang and 
Lundholm 1996). When more relevant information is available, analysts should depend less on 
individual research and be more likely to make more accurate and consistent forecasts at lower 
information acquisition and/or processing costs. Prior research (e.g., Ho et al. 1995, Lang et al. 
2003, Vanstraelen et al. 2003, Dhaliwal et al. 2012) suggests that the more value-relevant 
information used by analysts, the more accurate their forecasts. Since analysts’ forecast 
accuracy is a crucial determinant of career prospects and rewards (e.g., Stickel 1992, Mikhail 
et al. 1999, Hong et al. 2000, Hong and Kubik 2003, Clarke and Subramanian 2006, Leone and 
Wu 2007, Wu and Zang 2009), analysts should rely more on value-relevant disclosures, such 
as PBE disclosures, to maintain high forecast accuracy.  
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Due to the availability of PBE data, our sample period starts from year 2002, which is 
after the implementation of Reg. FD. Post Reg. FD, firms are restricted from selectively 
disclosing material non-public information to analysts. Consequently, it becomes less likely 
that analysts would bias their forecasts to please management for access to private 
information.5 Given this, analysts should care about their forecast accuracy, as this would 
determine their compensation and career prospects. In such a scenario, it is expected that 
analysts are likely to rely on PBE disclosures to help secure forecast accuracy; thus, PBE 
disclosures should attract more analyst coverage.  
The success of new products and business expansion is uncertain. This uncertainty adds 
complexity to the existing business model and potentially increases business risk. In essence, 
PBE activities introduce uncertainty and complexity to a firm’s business. This calls for and 
highlights the potential importance of firms’ voluntary PBE disclosures, which may reduce 
outsiders’ perceptions about the increased uncertainty and complexity arising from the PBE 
activities. Whether PBE disclosures turn out to also reduce analysts’ perceptions about the 
uncertainty and complexity depends on how uncertain analysts were before PBE 
announcements and how informative these announcements are to analysts. PBE plans, before 
being released to the public, pertain to private information held by insiders, but analysts are 
restricted from accessing such private information in the post Reg. FD era (in which our sample 
period for PBE disclosure data falls). In this scenario, absent PBE disclosures, it would be even 
more difficult for analysts to resolve the perceived uncertainty and complexity associated with 
                                                             
5 It is worth noting that the communications of private information between analysts and firm management 
are not fully prevented by Reg. FD (e.g., Soltes, 2014; Brown et al., 2015). That said, it is plausible to suggest 
that given potential reputational and/or legal penalties for non-compliance with Reg. FD, the private 
information communications between analysts and insiders, albeit not eliminated completely, are limited, as 
suggested in a large body of the Reg. FD literature (e.g., Koch et al., 2013). 
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PBE activities, than otherwise in the presence of such disclosures.6 In essence, our supply-
curve argument is that voluntary disclosures of PBE reduce analyst effort and costs in acquiring 
and/or processing information, and in resolving the perceived uncertainty and complexity 
associated with PBE, for purpose of maintaining forecast accuracy; this in turn attracts more 
analyst following. 
From the demand-curve perspective, we argue that the effect of voluntary disclosures on 
investor demand for analyst services depends on analyst efficiency, relative to that of outside 
investors, in processing such disclosures. If analysts are perceived by investors to be more 
sophisticated in processing voluntary disclosures, then additional voluntary disclosures should 
increase investor demand for analyst services and make analyst reports more valuable to 
investors. By contrast, if analysts are perceived to be less efficient than investors in processing 
voluntary disclosures, additional disclosures should reduce investor demand for analyst 
services and thereby crowd-out the information search by analysts. Applying this rationale to 
our research context, if analysts are perceived to be more (less) able than investors to 
extrapolate the implications of PBE disclosures for future earnings, then investors would have 
greater (lower) demand for analyst services, and accordingly, analyst coverage should increase 
(decrease) in response to additional PBE disclosures.  
Extant literature (e.g., Ball and Brown 1968, Bernard and Thomas 1989, Ball and Bartov 
1996, Kausar et al. 2009) provides evidence of various stock market anomalies, suggesting that 
markets do not always process new, publicly available information promptly and fully. This is 
                                                             
6 It is plausible that PBE disclosures do not reduce some unsophisticated investors’ perceived uncertainty 
about corporate PBE activities. However, we focus on examining analysts’ (rather than investors’) responses 
to PBE disclosures, and analysts are supposed to be more sophisticated in information processing than 
general investors (Chandra et al. 1999; Rajgopal et al. 2003). As such, we posit that PBE disclosures are 
likely to reduce analysts’ perceptions about uncertainty arising from PBE activities.  
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more so for investors in their processing of nonfinancial disclosures. There is no uniform 
format for the presentation of nonfinancial disclosures, resulting in a lack of comparability of 
such disclosures across firms (Maines et al. 2002, Simpson 2010). This raises the complexity 
to investors of analysing nonfinancial disclosures. Moreover, unlike management earnings 
forecasts which provide direct news about future earnings, nonfinancial disclosures are 
relatively hard to interpret with regards to implications for future earnings. Prior research 
documents that investors in general fail to appreciate the valuation implications of nonfinancial 
disclosures. For instance, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Bloomfield (2002) show that most 
investors are unable to process and trade on nonfinancial disclosures. Maines and McDaniel 
(2000) find that investors experience difficulties in understanding the value and earnings effects 
of nonfinancial disclosures.  
In contrast, prior studies demonstrate analysts’ efficient processing of nonfinancial 
information. For example, Chandra et al. (1999) find that analysts manage to distinguish 
permanent from transitory sales trends by using forward-looking industry-wide disclosures of 
new orders and shipments. Rajgopal et al. (2003) find evidence that the market misprices 
disclosures of order backlog, whereas financial analysts appear to recognise the implications 
of such disclosures for future revenues. Additionally, prior evidence (e.g., Barron et al. 1999, 
Hope 2003, Jones 2007, Dhaliwal et al. 2012) that nonfinancial disclosures lead to fewer 
analyst forecast errors and smaller forecast dispersion also supports the view that analysts are 
sophisticated in processing nonfinancial information.  
Because of potential risks associated with changes in products and with business 
expansions, it is difficult for outside investors to analyse the implications of PBE disclosures 
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for firms’ future prospects. Given investors’ limited information processing ability relative to 
that of analysts, additional PBE disclosures should spur the demand for analyst services. In 
addition to analyst forecast accuracy, investor demand for analyst services is yet another key 
determinant of analyst payoffs (e.g., Frankel et al. 2006, Beyer et al. 2010). So, if investor 
demand for analyst forecasts increases as a result of additional PBE disclosures, analyst 
coverage should concomitantly increase. In essence, to the extent that investors perceive 
themselves less capable than analysts to process a PBE disclosure promptly and to infer its 
implications for future earnings (to be empirically demonstrated further in the test of H2 
covered in Section 2.3), investors would be more reliant on analyst reports, thereby inducing 
more analyst following. Based on the above discussion from the perspectives of both supply of 
and demand for analyst services, we present our main hypothesis: 
H1: Voluntary disclosures of product and business expansion plans increase analyst 
coverage. 
 When firms have high information opacity, the extent to which PBE disclosures enrich the 
relevant information available to analysts and resolve the perceived uncertainty associated with 
PBE activities would likely be greater, thus potentially saving analysts’ effort and costs to a 
higher degree in the information acquisitions/processing. Furthermore, when corporate 
information is more opaque, it is more likely that investors perceive themselves as less capable 
than analysts to process PBE disclosures and thus have even higher demand for analyst services. 
Accordingly, we have the following hypothesis to buttress H1: 
H1a: Voluntary disclosures of product and business expansion plans increase analyst 
coverage to a larger extent for firms that have higher information opacity.  
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2.3 The association between PBE disclosures and the informativeness of analyst earnings 
forecasts 
Given the hypothesized, positive influence of PBE disclosures on analyst coverage, we 
consider whether such disclosures are correlated with the informativeness of analyst forecasts. 
Following Frankel et al. (2006), we define analyst forecast informativeness according to the 
magnitude of stock market reaction to analyst forecasts. In developing H1, we argued that 
analysts are perceived by investors as being more sophisticated in processing PBE disclosures, 
and thus that investor demand for analyst forecasts will increase with an increase in PBE 
disclosures. If these arguments hold true as we expect, the stock market should react more 
strongly to analyst forecasts in response to a PBE disclosure, resulting in a positive association 
between analyst forecast informativeness and PBE disclosures. If, however, investors believe 
themselves to be more able than analysts to process PBE disclosures, they will override analyst 
forecasts, leaving little room for analysts to promote the price formation process. In such a case, 
PBE disclosures do not render analyst forecasts more informative. The above discussion leads 
to our second supplemental hypothesis, stated in a null form as follows: 
H2: The informativeness of analyst earnings forecasts is unrelated to voluntary disclosures 
of product and business expansion plans. 
 
2.4 The association between PBE disclosures and analyst forecast errors 
Given the positive effect of PBE disclosures on analyst coverage, we explore whether 
such disclosures impact analyst forecast errors. We posit that, under two conditions, PBE 
disclosures are positively related to analyst forecast accuracy. The first condition is that PBE 
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disclosures do not exhibit systematic bias across firms. Such an assumption is likely to be 
tenable, because unlike short-term management earnings forecasts, PBE disclosures are much 
less likely to be generally used by managers to guide analyst short-term earnings expectations. 
Second, in the absence of PBE disclosures, analysts would not incur additional information 
acquisition and/or processing costs as a substitute to maintain their forecast accuracy. This 
assumption, however, does not necessarily hold. PBE information implies for long-term 
streams of a firm’s future revenues and should be the key input information for analyst forecasts 
and valuations. So, it is more likely that analysts would exert additional costs/efforts to seek 
substitutes for the absence of PBE disclosures. In such a case, we would not expect that PBE 
disclosures have significant influences on analyst forecast accuracy. Therefore, we have our 
third hypothesis stated in a null form as follows.  
H3: The errors in analyst earnings forecasts are unrelated to voluntary disclosures of 
product and business expansion plans. 
 
3 Data source and sample 
We obtain PBE disclosure data from Capital IQ. Capital IQ provides data on a variety of 
corporate developments, such as corporate guidance, product announcements, and business 
expansion announcements, all of which are voluntarily disclosed by publicly traded U.S. firms 
via press releases and news outlets. The announcements of PBE plans pertain to stand-alone 
disclosures which, in content, are exclusive of any other type of corporate reporting and 
disclosures; this helps make our empirical analysis relatively clean and not systematically 
subject to the confounding effects of other concurrent information disclosures. We restrict our 
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focus to press releases to ensure that PBE plan announcements were initiated by firms. Analyst 
forecast data are collected from I/B/E/S. Data on institutional holdings are taken from Factset. 
Other data are gathered from CRSP and Compustat. We require that firms have necessary data 
from CRSP, Compustat, I/B/E/S, and Factset to construct the variables of interest for our 
empirical tests. 
The availability of PBE disclosures data from Capital IQ narrows our sample period to 
2002-2012. Reg. FD, implemented in 2000, prohibits companies from disclosing material non-
public information to analysts. Hence, our sample period falling in the post Reg. FD period 
largely reduces the concern that both PBE disclosures and analyst research activities are 
endogenously driven by private corporate information. Panels A (B) of Table 1 presents the 
distribution of the incidence of PBE disclosures by year (industry). Firms in the industry of 
business equipment, telecommunication, and health have the highest incidence of PBE 
disclosures.  
There might exist systematic differences in firm characteristics between firms that make 
PBE disclosures and those that do not. This suggests potential endogeneity/selectivity issues 
associated with the decision to voluntarily disclose PBE information. To address this, we 
employ a caliper propensity-score-matching approach to obtain a sample that consists of the 
treatment observations (i.e., firm-years that have PBE disclosures) and the matched controlled 
observations (i.e., firm-years without a PBE disclosure). Each treatment observation is matched, 
without replacement, with a control observation using the closest propensity score.7  The 
                                                             
7 We change the matching ratio from one-to-one to one-to-two/one-to-three in our caliper propensity score 
matching, and obtain similar results and insights from all the related empirical tests. Nor our results change 
qualitatively if we employ a nearest-neighbourhood propensity-score-matching approach to balance the 
treatment sample and control sample groups. 
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propensity score is estimated from a logit regression, in which the incidence of PBE disclosures 
is modelled as the function of a vector of covariates. The covariates include capital 
expenditures (capex), intangible assets (intangible), firm size (size), book-to-market ratio (btm), 
sales growth (salesgrowth), abnormal stock returns (qtrret), abnormal trading volume 
(abtradvol), financial leverage (debt), litigation risk (litigation), earnings volatility 
(stdearnings), and finally proprietary costs of disclosures (proxied by mktsize, substitution, and 
entrycost, respectively). All are expected to be correlated with the incidence of PBE disclosures 
and are defined in Appendix I. The results of the logit regression are reported in Panel A of 
Appendix II. To ensure close matches, we set the caliper (i.e., the difference in propensity 
scores between the treatment and matched firm-years) to be 1%. Our final sample after the 
propensity score matching comprises 2,784 firm-year observations for 1,824 unique firms. 
 
4 Research design 
4.1 Test of the main hypothesis (H1 & H1a) 
It is possible that both PBE disclosures and analyst coverage are simultaneously 
determined by some omitted variable(s). It is also possible that insiders’ anticipation of future 
analyst coverage drives their current PBE disclosure decisions, thereby raising the possibility 
of reverse causality. However, because our sample period falls in the post Reg. FD period in 
which private-information communications between insiders and analysts are restricted, 
insiders’ ability to anticipate future analyst coverage is, arguably, also restricted; this helps 
mitigate the reverse causality possibility. To further alleviate endogeneity concerns, in our 
multivariate analysis, we measure analyst coverage in a way such that its measurement period 
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is preceded by that of PBE disclosures. We also include an extensive list of control variables 
that are likely related to both analyst coverage and PBE disclosures. We use firm-fixed-effects 
regression and two-stage-instrumental-variables regression technique, respectively, to check 
the robustness of our results.  
 The following regression model is specified to test the impact of PBE disclosures on 
analyst coverage: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
cov +lana inci stdearnings tradingvol salesgrowth beta intangible
retvol price regulated size btm insti capex qtrret +
      
        
     
       
   (1) 
The dependent variable is lanacov, which equals the natural logarithm of 1 plus the 
number of analysts that make at least one earnings-per-share (hereafters, EPS) forecast for a 
firm for a fiscal year following the beginning of the third fiscal quarter.8 lanacov equals 0 if 
there is no analyst forecasting the EPS for a firm over the last two fiscal quarters of a fiscal 
year. The treatment variable is inci, which is equal to 1 if a firm makes a product or business 
expansion plan disclosure over the first two fiscal quarters, and 0 otherwise.9 Based on H1, 
the coefficient for inci should be positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. 
We control for a broad set of variables to mitigate potential correlated-omitted-variables 
bias. Bhushan (1989) argues that investor demand for analyst services is greater for firms with 
greater uncertainty and thus analyst coverage for such firms should be higher. We use firm beta 
(beta) to control for firm-specific uncertainty, and expect it to be positively associated with 
                                                             
8 We measure analyst coverage and forecasts based on the window starting from the beginning of the third 
fiscal quarter, because analysts are reluctant to issue/revise their annual earnings forecasts in the first two 
fiscal quarters (e.g., Stickel 1989). Accordingly, our PBE disclosure variable is measured based on the 
window of the first two fiscal quarters. All our results remain qualitatively the same if we alternatively use 
the third (fourth) fiscal quarter as the measurement window for PBE disclosures (for analyst coverage and 
forecasts). 
9 Our results remain qualitatively the same if the frequency of PBE disclosures over the first two fiscal 
quarters is used as the treatment variable for the multivariate tests. 
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analyst coverage. Bhushan (1989) also contends that analyst coverage is positively correlated 
with institutional ownership, to the extent that institutional investors are the main clients of 
analyst services and account for the majority of transaction business in analyst brokerage 
houses. Thus, we control for institutional ownership (insti) and expect that insti has a positive 
relation with analyst coverage. We include firm size (size) as analysts tend to follow larger 
firms to generate more transaction business for their brokerage houses (Bhushan 1989). 
Investor gain from trading on firm-specific information is higher for firms with high return 
variability, which increases investor demand for analyst services and attracts more analyst 
coverage (Bhushan 1989). Therefore, we control for return volatility (retvol) which we expect 
to be positively related to analyst coverage.  
Brennan and Hughes (1991) show that share price is an inverse measure of the brokerage 
commission rate, and that analysts have incentives to follow firms with lower share prices. 
Brennan and Hughes (1991) also find a negative correlation between analyst coverage and 
stock returns. The reasons for this may be twofold. First, for firms that have experienced a large 
stock price appreciation, the major sources of value have already been exploited and analysts 
thus perceive the probability of discovering new sources of value to be relatively low. Second, 
analysts believe that firms with high abnormal returns are likely to be overvalued and be 
associated with lower future returns. Since analysts are reluctant to issue unfavourable opinions 
for firms that would underperform (McNichols and O'Brien 1997, Das et al. 2006), it follows 
that analysts are less likely to provide coverage for firms that have high abnormal stock returns. 
Therefore, we control for stock price (price) and stock returns (return) and expect them to be 
negatively related to analyst coverage.  
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Information asymmetry (put differently, the richness of corporate information 
environments) also affects analyst coverage. If analysts act as information intermediaries which 
process information from firms and relay it to investors, then richer information environments 
would likely attract more analyst following (Lang and Lundholm 1996, Chang et al. 2006). 
However, if financial analysts act as information providers that compete with other information 
disclosures, analyst coverage would decrease with the richness of firms’ information 
environments (Lang and Lundholm 1996). We control for the effect of information asymmetry 
by including intangible assets (intangible), capital expenditures (capex), sales growth 
(salesgrowth), and book-to-market ratio (btm), which extant literature (Aboody and Lev 2000, 
Barth et al. 2001, Huddart and Ke 2007) uses as proxies for information asymmetry. Ambiguity 
in accounting treatments of intangible assets and of capital expenditures (inclusive typically of 
research and development expenditures) is high, and hence high capital expenditures and large 
intangible assets are associated with high financial opacity and high information asymmetry. 
High growth firms, charaterized by the low book-to-market ratio, high capital expenditures, or 
high sales growth, tend to have greater information asymmetry, because managers of growth 
firms have superior knowledge about their firms’ investment opportunity set as well as future 
cash flow realizations (Smith and Watts 1992, Barth and Kasznik 1999, Huddart and Ke 2007).  
High earnings volatility increases information processing costs for analysts and makes it 
more difficult for them to forecast earnings accruately. As such, analysts are less inclined to 
follow firms that have high earnings variability (Lang and Lundholm 1996). We therefore 
control for earnings volatility (stdearnings) in our regression model. We control for the effect 
of industrial regulatory status (regulated), since prior research (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan 1990, 
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Groysberg et al. 2011) shows that analysts prefer to follow firms that operate within regulated 
industries. We include trading volume (tradingvol) in our regression. Because commission fees 
paid to financial analysts are based on trading volume which reflects outside investor demand 
for analyst services, analysts tend towards covering firms with high trading volume (Hayes 
1998, Frankel et al. 2006). Finally, we include industry- and year-fixed effects in our regression.  
As a robustness test for H1, we use firm-fixed-effects model to control for unobserved 
firm characteristics and cross-sectional heterogeneity. An effective firm-fixed-effects model 
requires that independent variables display sufficient within-firm variation over time. So, in 
applying firm-fixed-effects regression to model (1), we remove regulated (stdearnings) which 
has no (little) time-series variation. We also employ a two-stage-treatment-effect model to 
address potential endogeneity. Firms that are subject to high proprietary costs of disclosures 
should be less likely to disclose PBE plans to the public. But proprietary costs are unlikely to 
have direct impact on analyst coverage, making it a valid instrument for the two-stage 
treatment-effect regression.10 Following Karuna (2007), we use three dimensions of product 
market competition, product substitutability (substitution), market size (mktsize), and entry 
costs (entrycost), as the proxies for proprietary costs of disclosures. Public disclosures of PBE 
plans increase a firm’s risk of leaking its proprietary information to its competitors. A firm that 
has low product substitutability (substitution), low entry costs (entrycost), or large market size 
of competing products (mktsize) faces fierce product market competition and is thus subject to 
                                                             
10 The fundamental determinants of the firm-level analyst coverage are the expected costs and benefits to 
analysts of covering a firm (Bhushan 1989; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Frankel et al. 2006). Analysts can 
obtain the benefit of enhanced industry knowledge only when they cover a considerable amount of firms in 
the same industry. It is plausible that industrial product market competition drives the industry-level analyst 
coverage. But our study of the association between PBE disclosures and analyst coverage pertains to a firm-
level analysis. Thus, we expect that industrial market competition would not have a direct impact on the 
firm-level analyst coverage.  
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high proprietary costs of disclosures. Except the three instrumental variables, the control 
variables used in the first-step estimate of the two-stage regression are the same as those 
included in model (1) (Wooldridge 2000).  
H1a concerns whether the association between the incidence of PBE disclosures and 
analyst coverage is higher for firms with high information opacity. We use earnings volatility 
(stdearnings) to capture information opacity. The more volatile firm earnings, the more difficult 
is for analysts to synthesize earnings forecasts based on PBE disclosures, and the greater 
demand investors tend to have for analyst forecasts. Thus, earnings volatility is appropriate for 
use as a proxy for information opacity. In line with Ayers et al. (2011), we use the top (bottom) 
quintile point of the sample distribution of stdearnings as the cut-off point to define high (low) 
earnings volatility for the moderating effect analysis. In particular, earnings volatility is 
regarded as high (low) for an observation if it has the value of stdearnings higher (lower) than 
the top (bottom) quintile point. To test H1a, we split our sample into the high-earnings-volatility 
subsample and the low-earnings-volatility subsample, and run model (1) separately for these 
two subsamples. H1a predicts that the coefficient on inci is more positive for the high-earnings-
volatility subsample than for the low-earnings-volatility subsample.  
 
4.2 Tests of the supplemental hypotheses (H2 & H3) 
To conduct the supplemental test of whether the informativeness of analyst earnings 
forecasts is related to voluntary PBE disclosures, we use the following regression model:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
+car inci stdearnings tradingvol salesgrowth beta retvol
intangible price regulated size btm insti capex qtrret +
      
        
      
      
  (2) 
The dependent variable, car, equals the three-day [-1, 1] cumulative unsigned abnormal 
22 
 
stock returns around an analyst’s last EPS forecast issued for the current fiscal year following 
the beginning of the third fiscal quarter.11 The abnormal stocks returns are calculated using a 
market model with an estimation period of [-181, -2] relative to the forecast date. If there are 
multiple analysts who make the EPS forecasts for the same firm, car is taken as the average of 
the abnormal returns associated with these forecasts. As reported in Panel A of Table 2, the 
mean value of car is 0.089, indicating that, on average, the market reacts positively to analyst 
earnings forecasts made in the last two fiscal quarters. We control for trading volume 
(tradingvol), firm beta (beta), return volatility (retvol), stock price (price), firm size (size), 
analyst forecast revision (revision), book-to-market ratio (btm), institutional ownership (insti), 
capital expenditures (capex), sales growth (salesgrowth), earnings volatility (stdearnings), 
industrial regulatory status (regulated), intangible assets (intangible), abnormal stock returns 
(qtrret), and industry- and year-fixed effects. All of the above are documented by prior research 
(e.g., Frankel et al. 2006, Arand et al. 2015) to be related to the informativeness of analyst 
forecasts. If PBE disclosures increase the informativeness of analyst forecasts, inci should have 
a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
We use the following regression model for the supplemental test of whether analyst 
forecast errors are associated with voluntary PBE disclosures:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13
+error inci retvol size btm horizon price intangible
capex salesgrowth abtradvol dedi qtrret changeeps+
       
      
      
     
     (3) 
                                                             
11 We use the last forecast of EPS for a fiscal year for three reasons. First, it reflects analysts’ ability to 
aggregate complex information (inclusive critically of PBE information therein) and to translate it into an 
output in a form that is more informative to and more demanded by investors. Second, it represents analysts’ 
most updated expectations about a firm’s future earnings and hence might be valued the most by outsiders. 
Third, it facilitates a relatively clear-cut lead-lag setting to establish a causal relation between PBE 
disclosures and analyst forecast informativeness. We obtain qualitatively the same results if the first forecast 
of EPS after the beginning of the third fiscal quarter is used alternatively to define car.  
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error is equal to the absolute difference between actual EPS and a given analyst’s last 
forecast of EPS for a given firm for a fiscal year following the beginning of the third fiscal 
quarter, divided by the firm’s stock price.12 If there are multiple analysts who make the EPS 
forecasts for the firm, the average is taken of these analysts’ last forecasts of EPS. Based on 
prior literature (e.g., Huberts and Fuller 1995, Lang and Lundholm 1996, Das et al. 1998, Lim 
2001, Ali et al. 2007, Dhaliwal et al. 2011), we control for abnormal trading volume (abtradvol), 
forecast horizon (horizon), return volatility (retvol), stock price (price), firm size (size), the 
book-to-market ratio (btm), dedicated institutional ownership (dedi), sales growth 
(salesgrowth), capital expenditures (capex), intangible assets (intangible), abnormal stock 
returns (qtrret), change in annual EPS (changeeps), and industry- and year-fixed effects. If PBE 
disclosures reduce analyst forecast errors, the coefficient for inci should be negative and 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Covariate balance check after propensity score matching 
In applying propensity score matching, it is advisable to check whether the distributions 
of covariates are balanced between treatment and control samples (Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2008). We attempt this by using two-sample t-tests and standardised bias. The formula for 
calculating the standardised bias is as follows (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985): 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 =
?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡−?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
√𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
2 +𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
2
2
                     (4) 
                                                             
12 For the same reasons as mentioned in footnote 11, we use the last forecast of EPS for a fiscal year to 
define error. Our results remain qualitatively the same if the first forecast of EPS after the beginning of the 
third fiscal quarter is used to define error.  
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?̅?  represents the mean value of a covariate; 𝑠2  represents the standard deviation of a 
covariate to the power of two. As mentioned in Section 3, the vector of covariates pertains to 
the determinants of the incidence of PBE disclosures. Panel B of Appendix II reports the results 
for the covariate balance check. From the results of two-sample tests of mean, we can see that 
the covariates are, in general, statistically indistinguishable between treatment and control 
groups. Nearly all the mean differences in the covariates are statistically insignificant, with the 
standardised bias of less than 10% for most covariates. This indicates that our matching 
procedure approaches a covariate balance and thus has substantively reduced observable 
differences across the PBE disclosure sample and non-PBE disclosure sample. In ensuring that 
the treatment and control samples differ insignificantly along most of the observable firm-
specific covariates, we increase the chance that they might also differ insignificantly along 
unobservable firm-specific covariates, and as a result, potential endogeneity bias is reduced 
(Roberts and Whited 2012).  
 
5.2 Univariate results 
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables involved in the 
multivariate tests. lanacov, the natural logarithm of 1 plus analyst coverage, has a mean value 
of 2.603, suggesting that our sample firms, on average, are followed by 15 analysts over the 
last two fiscal quarters of a year. The mean value of freq is 2.051, implying that a firm, on 
average, makes two PBE announcements over the first two fiscal quarters of a year. The mean 
of car, which represents the average abnormal stock returns to PBE disclosures, amounts to 
0.089; this suggests that PBE disclosures are value-relevant. Panel B of Table 2 reports the 
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results for the two-sample tests of mean and median values. lanacov averages 3.1494 for the 
treatment group and 2.6030 for the control group. The mean difference amounts to 0.5464 and 
is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat.=11.802). The treatment sample has a median 
value of lanacov up to 3.2581, which is higher than the median of lanacov for the control 
sample. The median difference is 0.2624, which is statistically significant at the 1% level 
(Chi2=8.247). These results lend initial support to our prediction that PBE disclosures induce 
more analyst coverage. Table 3 shows the results for the Spearman correlation among the 
variables used in model (1). lanacov is positively correlated with inci. The magnitude of the 
correlation amounts to 15.63% and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This correlation 
result is consistent with H1: that analyst coverage is higher for firms which have PBE 
disclosures compared to firms that do not.  
 
5.3 Multivariate regression results 
Table 4 presents the OLS regression results for the test of H1. The coefficient on inci is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This supports H1: that PBE disclosures 
increase analyst coverage. A one-unit change in inci leads to an increase in lanacov by 0.409, 
which is equivalent to 14.22% of the mean value of lanacov for our overall sample and is 
economically significant. The coefficients for the majority of the control variables are 
statistically significant in the expected direction. Column (1) of Table 5 reports the firm-fixed-
effects regression results for our hypothesis test. The coefficient for inci is positive and highly 
significant at the 1% level, again consistent with H1.  
Column (2) of Table 5 reports the two-stage treatment-effect regression results. In the 
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first-step probit estimate, mktsize (entrycost) has a negative (positive), statistically significant 
coefficient. This is in line with the notion that high proprietary costs of disclosures, as proxied 
by high mktsize and low entrycost, dis-incentivize managers to voluntarily disclose PBE plans 
to the public. The significant coefficients for mktsize and entrycost support their validity for 
use as instruments in our two-stage treatment-effect model (Lennox et al. 2012). For the 
second-stage regression result, the coefficient for inci is significantly positive at the 1% level, 
suggesting that our results reported in Table 4 are robust to correcting for endogeneity.  
 Table 6 reports the results for the test of H1a. The coefficient for inci is incrementally 
more positive in the high-stdearnings subsample than in the low-stdearnings subsample; the 
difference in the coefficient for inci is statistically significant (λ2=3.85; p=0.0498). These 
results suggest that when firms have high information opacity, PBE disclosures would increase 
analyst coverage to a larger extent. This is consistent with H1a.  
 Table 7 reports the regression results for the test of the supplemental hypothesis, H2. inci 
has a positive, statistically significant coefficient, supporting the argument that PBE disclosures 
increase the informativeness of analyst earnings forecasts. The coefficient for inci in Column 
(1) ((2)) suggests that a one-unit increase in inci leads to an increase in car by 0.0073 (0.00461), 
which accounts for 8.20% (5.18%) of the overall sample mean of car and is economically 
significant. Reg. FD prohibits insiders from releasing private information to analysts without 
simultaneously disclosing it to general investors. As a consequence, the information gap 
between analysts and investors is reduced. Analysts and investors have equivalent exposures 
to publicly available PBE information. A natural follow-up question to ask is whether given 
the same access to PBE information as analysts do, investors are still reliant on analysts for 
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their trading decisions. Our analysis, which is carried out based on a sample period enclosed in 
the post Reg. FD period, sheds light on this issue. Specifically, our results for H2 indicate that 
investor demand for analyst earnings forecasts increases in response to a given PBE disclosure, 
therein reinforcing the view that analysts are regarded by investors as more efficient 
information processors on PBE disclosures. This result supports the importance of analysts’ 
role in enhancing informational efficiency of capital markets, and is also consistent with our 
presumption made in support of H1.  
Table 8 report the results for the test of the supplemental hypothesis, H3. It is shown that 
the coefficient on inci, albeit negative, is not statistically significant. There is no evidence 
suggesting that analyst forecast errors are negatively related to the incidence of PBE disclosures. 
This suggests that in maintaining forecast accuracy, analysts tend to incur additional 
information acquisition and/or processing costs to make up for the absence of a PBE disclosure 
from a firm.13 The insignificant result, however, does not contradict with our earlier argument 
that PBE disclosures help analysts increase forecast accuracy at lower information acquisition 
and/or processing costs. 
 
6. Additional analysis 
     To examine the robustness of our results, we conduct two additional analyses. First, we 
                                                             
13 The insignificant association between analyst forecast errors and the incidence of PBE disclosures could 
imply that analysts assign the same weight to the disclosures in forecasting as the weight attributable to this 
PBE information in the earnings generating process. This possibility, however, is less likely to systematically 
exist, not least as prior research documents that (i) there exists significant heterogeneity in the value-relevant 
information sets that are held and processed by different analysts (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996); (ii) the 
forecasting models used by different analysts differ substantively (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996; Ramnath 
et al. 2008); (iii) the sophistication in, and capability of, processing value-relevant information vary 
considerably across different analysts (e.g., Clement et al. 2007; Ramnath et al. 2008).  
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use an automated coarsening k-to-k coarsened exact matching to form our sample for the tests 
of H1-H3. For this, we match the treatment firms with the control firms based on the same 
covariates as we use for the propensity score matching, and then run models (1)-(3) based on 
the coarsened-exact-matched sample. The coarsening bounds used for covariates are chosen ex 
ante in an automatic manner, obviating the need to check ex post the covariate balance. Instead 
of doing the covariate balance check, L1 statistics could be used to check the quality of the 
matching (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2010; Iacus et al., 2012). If L1 statistics are significantly 
reduced post-matching, the quality of matching can be assured. As reported in Panel A of Table 
9, the post-matched L1 statistics are significantly lower than the pre-matched ones for the 
majority of the covariates. Panel B reports the regression results for the re-tests of H1-H3 which 
are done based on the coarsened-exact-matched sample; we see that the results are qualitatively 
identical to those reported in Tables 4, 7, and 8.  
     Second, the effect of PBE disclosures on analyst coverage and forecasts may vary 
systematically across different industries, causing the residuals of our estimated regressions to 
be correlated within industries. To address this concern, we repeat our regression analysis for 
H1-H3 by clustering the standard errors of the regression coefficients by industry. The results 
(available upon request) remain qualitatively the same, thus supporting H1-H3.  
 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the impact of voluntary disclosures of PBE plans on analyst 
coverage and forecasts. We argue for a positive link between PBE disclosures and analyst 
coverage from both the supply- and demand-curve perspectives. First, given that PBE 
29 
 
disclosures have strong implications for the long-term stream of a firm’s future revenues, PBE 
disclosures should increase the amount of value-relevant information available to analysts, 
helping them reach more accurate and consensus conclusions at lower information gathering 
and/or processing costs. Second, analysts are arguably more able than investors to decipher the 
implications of PBE disclosures for future earnings. It follows from this that PBE disclosures 
would increase investor demand for analyst forecasts and thereby attract more analyst 
following. Both arguments lead to the same prediction, namely, that analyst coverage is 
positively associated with the incidence of PBE disclosures. After controlling for potential 
endogeneity, we find results consistent with this prediction.  
 We also find that the incidence of PBE disclosures is positively related to the market 
reaction to analyst earnings forecasts, which suggests that investors perceive analysts to be 
more capable of inferring the implications of PBE disclosures for future earnings and that 
investor demand for analyst forecasts increases in response to a PBE disclosure. This finding 
supports analysts’ role in promoting the informational efficiency of capital markets, but is in 
contrast with some prior studies (e.g., Lin and McNichols 1998, Michaely and Womack 1999). 
Finally, we find no evidence that the incidence of PBE disclosures is negatively associated with 
analyst forecast errors, implying that absent a PBE disclosure, analysts have an intent to take 
more efforts and costs to acquire and process information that is necessary for securing forecast 
accuracy, and that disclosures of PBE plans save analysts such efforts and costs.14  
Overall, our study holds implications for academics and practitioners in their 
                                                             
14 Analyst efforts are unobservable and are difficult to measure and test empirically in an acceptable manner 
in an archival study. Any empirical proxy for analyst efforts inevitably involve nontrivial measurement errors, 
which are thus likely to yield spurious results and inferences in any empirical analysis. We therefore leave 
this issue as an avenue for future research in an experimental setting. 
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understanding of the role that PBE disclosures may play in financial analysts’ decisions. 
Specifically, PBE activities play a key role in business development and value creation for 
firms. As such, the analysis of PBE disclosures is crucial in the valuation process. However, 
investors might lack analytical skills to evaluate the implications of PBE disclosures for firms’ 
future prospects. Financial analysts may assist investors in this aspect, that is, in helping them 
better understand and trade on firm PBE disclosures. Indeed, we find evidence to suggest that 
investors are more inclined to resort to analyst forecasts in the presence of PBE disclosures. It 
thus becomes important that analysts, as information intermediaries, do a good job in 
incorporating the PBE-related information into their forecasts. Given our evidence that PBE 
disclosures not only attract greater analyst coverage but also increase investor demand for 
analyst forecasts, we may deduce that voluntary disclosures of PBE plans are conducive to 
promoting the capital market efficiencies via the channel of financial analysts. Thus, PBE 
disclosures should be encouraged by both firms and regulators, though such disclosures might, 
in some sense/cases, be difficult for investors to understand in terms of the implications for 
firms’ future prospects.   
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Table 1 Distribution of the incidence of PBE disclosures 
 
Panel A: The average incidence of PBE disclosures across years 
Year Mean inci Number of observations 
2002 0.4483 29 
2003 0.4242 33 
2004 0.4857 70 
2005 0.4854 103 
2006 0.5047 107 
2007 0.5676 111 
2008 0.5313 367 
2009 0.5280 500 
2010 0.4955 553 
2011 0.4651 688 
2012 0.4978 223 
 
Panel B: The average incidence of PBE disclosures across the Fama-French 12 industries 
Industry (SIC) distribution Mean inci Number of observations 
Consumer nondurables --- food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, 
leather, toys  
0.5079 126 
Consumer durables --- cars, TVs, furniture, household 
appliances 
0.4677 62 
Manufacturing --- machinery, trucks, planes, paper, computer 
printing 
0.4644 267 
Energy --- oil, gas, and coal extraction and products 0.3727 110 
Chemistry --- chemicals and allied products 0.4634 423 
Business Equipment --- computers, software, and electronic 
equipment 
0.6223 887 
Telecommunication --- telephone and television transmission 0.5694 72 
Utilities 0.5000 36 
Shops --- wholesale, retail, and some services such as 
laundries, repair shops 
0.3581 296 
Health --- healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs 0.6115 157 
Money --- finance 0.3462 52 
Others -- mines, construction, transportations, hotels, bus 
services, entertainment 
0.3615 296 
Notes: Panel A reports the incidence of PBE disclosures by year. Panel B presents the incidence of PBE disclosures 
based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The observations are at the firm-year level for the sample 
period of 2002-2012. 
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Table 2 Univarate statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of variables 
Variables 
No. of 
firm-
years 
No. of 
unique 
firms 
Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev. 
lanacov 2784 1824 2.8762 2.3026 3.1355 3.7612 1.2513 
car 2300 1472 0.0890 0.0481 0.0757 0.1126 0.0568 
error 2273 1447 0.0379 0.0018 0.0055 0.0169 0.1377 
inci 2784 1824 0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 0.5001 
freq 2784 1824 2.0510 0.0000 0.5000 2.0000 4.6558 
stdearnings 2784 1824 2.4391 0.1827 0.5117 1.5374 12.4122 
tradingvol 2784 1824 53.7607 1.8259 9.2867 40.6420 145.0918 
intangible 2784 1824 0.0215 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0891 
beta 2784 1824 1.1499 0.8234 1.1231 1.4529 0.4846 
retvol 2784 1824 0.1375 0.0868 0.1195 0.1661 0.0923 
price 2784 1824 26.3156 7.7200 18.7750 35.2950 34.4513 
regulated 2784 1824 0.0374 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1897 
size 2784 1824 6.8502 5.5923 6.8205 8.0602 1.8780 
btm 2784 1824 0.5703 0.2565 0.4385 0.7323 0.5277 
insti 2784 1824 0.6338 0.4012 0.7195 0.8915 0.3316 
capex 2784 1824 0.0424 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7603 
salesgrowth 2784 1824 0.2859 -0.0538 0.0715 0.2124 3.6755 
qtrret 2784 1824 0.0331 -0.1607 0.0014 0.1637 0.3439 
debt 2784 1824 0.0810 0.0000 0.0000 0.1277 0.1374 
litigation 2784 1824 0.3671 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4821 
substitution 2784 1824 1.1539 1.0840 1.1298 1.2367 0.1766 
mktsize 2784 1824 0.3339 0.0306 0.1616 0.3963 0.4542 
entrycost 2784 1824 0.0129 0.0018 0.0084 0.0130 0.0229 
 
Panel B: Univariate analysis 
Variables Mean 
inci=0 
Mean 
inci=1 
Mean differences 
(t-stat.) 
Median 
inci=0 
Median 
inci=1 
Median differences 
(Chi2) 
lanacov 2.6030 3.1494 -0.5464 
   (-11.802)*** 
2.9957 3.2581 -0.2624 
  (-8.247)*** 
stdearnings 3.0698 1.8083 1.2615 
  (2.6842)*** 
0.4900 0.5309 -0.0409 
(-1.181) 
tradingvol 46.1461 61.3753 -15.2292 
  (-2.772)*** 
7.8798 10.4501 -2.5703 
  (-4.287)*** 
intangible 0.0220 0.0210 0.0011 
(0.315) 
0 0 0 
(-0.540) 
beta 1.1149 1.1849 -0.0699 
   (-3.816)*** 
1.0969 1.1470 -0.0501 
  (-3.526)*** 
retvol 0.1376 0.1373 0.0003 
(0.079) 
0.1167 0.1229 -0.0062 
  (-2.214) ** 
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price 26.3552 26.2760 0.0792 
(0.061) 
20.2850 17.6900 2.5950 
(1.419) 
regulated 0.0460 0.0287 0.0172 
 (2.400)** 
0 0 0 
 (2.398) ** 
size 6.7899 6.9105 -0.1206 
 (-1.695)* 
6.8366 6.8187 0.0179 
(-1.021) 
btm 0.5548 0.5859 -0.0311 
(-1.556) 
0.4329 0.4410 -0.0081 
(-0.299) 
insti 0.5974 0.6701 -0.0727 
  (-5.818)*** 
0.6901 0.7416 -0.0515 
  (-4.816)*** 
capex 0.0630 0.0217 0.0413 
(1.433) 
0 0 0 
(-0.716) 
salesgrowth 
 
0.3843 0.1875 0.1967 
(1.412) 
0.0631 0.0772 -0.0141 
  (-2.411) ** 
qtrret 0.0313 0.0349 -0.0036 
(-0.277) 
0.0011 0.0016 -0.0005 
(-0.507) 
Notes: Panel A tabulates descriptive statistics of the variables used for the hypothesis tests. The sample period 
ranges from 2002 to 2012. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. Panel B reports the univariate results for 
the two-sample tests of mean and median for the main hypothesis. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 2012. 
inci equals 1 if a firm discloses a product or business expansion plan over the first two fiscal quarters; and 0 
otherwise. There are 1,392 firm-year observations in the disclosure (inci=1) and non-disclosure (inci=0) samples, 
respectively. lanacov equals the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts that make at least one EPS 
forecast for a firm for a fiscal year following the beginning of the third fiscal quarter. All the other variables are 
defined in Appendix I. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively.  
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 
Variables lanacov inci stdearnings tradingvol intangible beta retvol price regulated size btm insti capex qtrret salesgrowth 
lanacov 1               
                
inci 0.1563 1              
 (0.0000)               
stdearnings 0.4163 0.0224 1             
 (0.0000) (0.2380)              
tradingvol 0.8140 0.0813 0.5425 1            
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)             
intangible 0.0969 0.0102 0.1151 0.1499 1           
 (0.0000) (0.5890) (0.0000) (0.0000)            
beta 0.1441 0.0668 0.0456 0.1248 0.00270 1          
 (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0160) (0.0000) (0.8850)           
retvol -0.2255 0.0420 -0.1561 -0.3145 -0.1248 0.3019 1         
 (0.0000) (0.0268) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)          
price 0.5101 -0.0269 0.2689 0.6777 0.1335 -0.0405 -0.5136 1        
 (0.0000) (0.1560) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0328) (0.0000)         
regulated -0.0568 -0.0455 -0.0246 -0.0171 0.00360 -0.0963 -0.1246 0.0550 1       
 (0.0027) (0.0164) (0.1950) (0.3670) (0.8510) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0037)        
size 0.7296 0.0193 0.5491 0.8993 0.1901 0.0458 -0.4845 0.7473 0.0335 1      
 (0.0000) (0.3080) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0157) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0776)       
btm -0.1394 0.00570 -0.0791 -0.1982 0.0186 0.0332 0.0996 -0.2423 0.0184 -0.2780 1     
 (0.0000) (0.7650) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3260) (0.0797) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3310) (0.0000)      
insti 0.4323 0.0913 0.1290 0.4454 -0.0305 0.1185 -0.2175 0.4186 -0.0628 0.3676 -0.0341 1    
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1070) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0720)     
capex 0.1235 0.0136 0.1055 0.1588 0.5337 -0.0308 -0.1718 0.1689 -0.0145 0.1900 -0.0615 0.0424 1   
 (0.0000) (0.4740) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1040) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4450) (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.0253)    
qtrret 0.1021 0.00960 0.0266 0.1278 -0.0097 0.0251 -0.0826 0.2759 -0.0201 0.2145 -0.2166 0.0953 0.0402 1  
 (0.0000) (0.6120) (0.1600) (0.0000) (0.6080) (0.1860) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2890) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0338)   
salesgrowth 0.0997 0.0457 0.0229 0.1281 0.0423 0.0688 -0.0485 0.2220 -0.0029 0.1480 -0.2247 0.0275 0.0798 0.2015 1 
 (0.0000) (0.0159) (0.2270) (0.0000) (0.0256) (0.0003) (0.0105) (0.0000) (0.8800) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1470) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Notes: Table 3 presents the results for the Spearman correlations in the lower triangle. The correlation matrix involves the variables used for the main hypothesis tests. The 
sample comprises 2,784 firm-years that cover the period 2002-2012. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. p-values for the correlation matrix are provided in parentheses.  
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Table 4 Test of H1: an OLS regression of analyst coverage on PBE disclosures 
                                                         
Variables  Predicted sign lanacov  
inci  + 0.409 
   (11.73) *** 
stdearnings  + -0.00928 
   (-3.57) *** 
tradingvol  + 0.000194 
   (1.09) 
beta  + 0.341 
   (8.43) *** 
retvol  + 0.383 
   (1.20) 
price  - -0.000990 
   (-1.44) 
intangible  - -0.294 
   (-1.67) * 
regulated  + 0.281 
   (1.64) 
size  + 0.420 
   (26.43) *** 
btm  + 0.0457 
   (1.13) 
insti  + 0.755 
   (10.29) *** 
salesgrowth  - 0.00201 
   (0.83) 
capex  - -0.0117 
   (-0.51) 
qtrret   - -0.150 
   (-3.08) *** 
constant  ? -1.353 
   (-8.33) *** 
    
Observations   2784 
Adj. R-square   0.58 
Notes: Table 5 reports the OLS regression results for the tests of the impact of the incidence of PBE disclosures 
on analyst coverage. The sample period is 2002-2012. The dependent variable, lanacov, equals the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts that make at least one EPS forecast for a firm for a fiscal year following 
the beginning of the third fiscal quarter. The treatment variable, inci, equals 1 if a firm discloses a product or 
business expansion plan over the first two fiscal quarters; and 0 otherwise. All the other variables are defined in 
Appendix I. Year and industry dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The 
industry dummies are constructed based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. p-values in parentheses 
are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical 
significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5 Tests of H1: Controlling for endogeneity 
 
Variables 
Firm-fixed-effects model  Two-stage-treatment-effect model 
(1) lanacov (2a) First-stage (inci) (2b) Second-stage (lanacov) 
inci 0.165  0.761 
    (4.83) ***     (6.31) *** 
substitution  0.0463  
  (0.21)  
mktsize  -0.331  
    (-2.16) **  
entrycost  7.045  
  (2.16) **  
stdearnings  -0.0361 -0.00836 
    (-4.10) ***    (-3.98) *** 
tradingvol 0.000308 0.00112 0.000110 
 (1.58) (3.37) *** (0.64) 
beta 0.112 0.226 0.309 
  (2.51) **  (3.49) ***    (7.43) *** 
retvol -0.271 -0.152 0.402 
 (-1.52) (-0.53) (1.32) 
price 0.00109 -0.000303 -0.00102 
 (1.24) (-0.24) (-1.35) 
intangible 0.306 -0.197 -0.273 
 (1.33) (-0.55) (-1.47) 
regulated  -0.0159 0.312 
  (-0.04) (2.09) ** 
size 0.259 0.0205 0.420 
   (6.86) *** (0.76) (26.30) *** 
btm 0.232 0.150 0.0288 
   (4.16) *** (2.54) ** (0.72) 
insti 0.545 0.356 0.705 
   (5.16) *** (3.24) *** (9.43) *** 
salesgrowth  -0.00129 -0.0115 0.00311 
 (-1.30) (-1.43) (1.21) 
capex 0.000691 -0.0459 -0.00675 
 (0.08) (-1.35) (-0.30) 
qtrret -0.111 0.0297 -0.156 
    (-3.38) *** (0.41)   (-3.19) *** 
constant 0.388 -1.230 -0.00836 
 (1.29)    (-3.79) ***  (-3.98) *** 
    
Observations 2784 2784 2784 
R-square/Wald Chi2 0.229 0.0658 3564.41 
Notes: Table 6 reports the regression results for the tests of H1 which control for potential endogeneity. The sample 
period is 2002-2012. Column (1) reports the firm-fixed-effects regression results. Because the firm-fixed-effects 
regression automatically omits explanatory variables that have no/little within-firm variance in the explanatory 
variables, regulated and stdearnings are omitted by the firm-fixed-effects regression estimates. Year and industry 
dummies are included in the fixed-effect regression but not reported for simplicity. Columns (2) report the results 
for the two-stage treatment effect regression. The first-step probit estimate shows the determinants of the incidence 
of PBE disclosures (inci). The instruments, substitution, mktsize, and entrycost, are the three proprietary costs 
proxies developed by Karuna (2007) and are defined in Appendix I. Year and industry dummies are included in 
both the 1st and 2nd stage regressions but not reported for brevity. The industry dummies are constructed based on 
the Fama-French 12 industry classification. p-values in parentheses are based on the standard errors clustered by 
firm. All variables are defined in Appendix I. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6  Tests of H1a: The moderating effect of information opacity 
 
Variables Lanacov 
 High stdearnings Low stearnings 
Intercept -2.6383 -2.6451 
    (-4.44) ***   (-4.57) *** 
inci 0.5288 0.3315 
  (6.48) ***    (4.19) *** 
stdearnings -0.0088 -0.1342 
   (-3.82) *** (-0.11) 
tradingvol 0.00003 0.0027 
 (0.14)  (2.03) ** 
beta 0.4653 0.2721 
  (3.77) ***   (2.95) *** 
retvol 0.6280 1.0836 
 (0.76) (1.57) 
price -0.0018 -0.0025 
 (-1.16) (-0.84) 
intangible -0.2464 -0.1910 
  (-0.60) (-0.45)  
regulated 0.3288 1.0487 
 (2.36) **  (5.63) *** 
size 0.4750 0.3937 
   (11.49) ***  (6.58) *** 
btm 0.0307 -0.0111 
 (0.27) (-0.15) 
insti 0.5440 1.1301 
   (2.97) ***  (4.87) *** 
salesgrowth -0.0420 0.0163 
 (-0.90) (1.19) 
capex -0.1081 0.0276 
 (-2.49) ** (0.34) 
qtrret -0.3011 -0.1086 
 (-1.98) ** (-1.06) 
   
Observations 556 556 
R-square 0.5032 0.6547 
Notes: Table 7 reports the OLS regression results for the tests of H1a as to whether the impact of the 
incidence of PBE disclosures on analyst coverage is moderated by information opacity. The sample period 
is 2002-2012. The dependent variable, lanacov, equals the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts 
that make at least one EPS forecast for a firm for a fiscal year following the beginning of the third fiscal 
quarter. The treatment variable, inci, equals 1 if a firm discloses a product or business expansion plan over 
the first two fiscal quarters; and 0 otherwise. The moderator variable is stdearnings, measured by the standard 
deviation of income before extraordinary items for the previous five fiscal years. Our sample is split into the 
high-stdearnings subsample and low-stdearnings subsample, which contain observations with stdearnings 
higher than the top sample quintile point, and those with stdearnings lower than the bottom sample quintile 
point, respectively. All the other variables are defined in Appendix I. Year and industry dummies are included 
in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The industry dummies are constructed based on the Fama-
French 12 industry classification. p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7 Test of the supplemental hypothesis (H2): The association between the 
informativeness of analyst forecasts and PBE disclosures 
 
Variables car 
inci 0.0073 0.00461 
  (2.86) *** (2.09) ** 
stdearnings  -0.00000180 
  (-0.92) 
tradingvol  0.0000219 
  (2.78) *** 
beta  0.00456 
  (1.52) 
retvol  0.227 
  (7.37) *** 
price  -0.0000190 
  (-0.67) 
intangible  -0.00266 
  (-0.24) 
regulated  -0.0130 
  (-1.24) 
size  -0.00803 
  (-7.42) *** 
btm  0.00240 
  (0.60) 
insti  0.00379 
  (0.87) 
salesgrowth  0.0000808 
  (0.49) 
capex   -0.000983 
  (-0.86) 
qtrret  0.00270 
  (0.55) 
constant 0.0299 0.111 
  (5.46) *** (8.15) *** 
   
Observations 2300 2300 
Adjusted R-square 0.0908 0.276 
Notes: Table 8 shows the OLS regression result for the test of the supplemental hypothesis as to the association between 
analyst earnings forecast informativeness and the incidence of PBE disclosures. The sample period is 2002-2012. The 
dependent variable, car, equals the three-day [-1, 1] cumulative unsigned abnormal stock returns surrounding an 
analyst’s last forecast of EPS for a given fiscal year after the beginning of the third fiscal quarter. The abnormal stock 
returns are calculated using market model with an estimation period of [-181, -2] relative to the forecast date. If there 
are multiple analysts who make the EPS forecasts for the same firm, car is taken as the average of the abnormal stock 
returns associated with these forecasts. inci equals 1 if a firm discloses a product or business expansion plan over the 
first two fiscal quarters; and 0 otherwise. All the other variables are defined in Appendix I. Year and industry dummies 
are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The industry dummies are constructed based on the Fama-
French 12 industry classification. p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, 
* represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
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Table 8 Test of the supplemental hypothesis (H3): The association between analyst 
forecast errors and PBE disclosures 
 
Variables error 
inci -0.00547 
 (-1.06) 
retvol 0.254 
 (4.36) *** 
size -0.00757 
 (-3.57) *** 
btm 0.0571 
 (3.09) *** 
horizon 0.0000576 
 (0.52) 
price 0.0000305 
 (0.59) 
intangible 0.0295 
 (0.83) 
capex 0.000693 
 (0.46) 
salesgrowth -0.000345 
 (-1.79) * 
abtradvol -0.00000146 
 (-0.05) 
dedi -0.0103 
 (-0.32) 
qtrret -0.0143 
 (-1.75) * 
changeeps -0.0147 
 (-1.41) 
constant 0.0157 
 (0.59) 
  
Observations 1906 
Adjusted R-square 0.151 
Notes: Table 9 shows the OLS regression result for the test of the supplemental hypothesis as to the association 
between analyst earnings forecast errors and the incidence of PBE disclosures. The sample period is 2002-2012. 
The dependent variable, error, equals the absolute difference between actual EPS and an analyst’s last forecast of 
EPS for a given firm for a fiscal year following the beginning of the third fiscal quarter, divided by the firm’s 
stock price. If there are multiple analysts that make the EPS forecast for the firm, the average is taken of the 
analysts’ last forecasts of EPS. inci equals 1 if a firm disclose a product or business expansion plan over the first 
two fiscal quarters; and 0 otherwise. All the other variables are defined in Appendix I. Year and industry dummies 
are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The industry dummies are constructed based on the 
Fama-French 12 industry classification. p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 9  Additional test: Use the coarsened exact matching method for the tests of H1-
H3 
 
Panel A: Diagnostic check of the quality of coarsened exact matching 
Variables Pre-matched L1 statistics Post-matched L1 statistics 
capex 0.02131 0.01748 
salesgrowth 0.00307 0.00599 
abtradvol 0.21259 0.09016 
qtrret 0.066 0.0512 
intangible 0.03628 0.02248 
size 0.18979 0.03347 
btm 0.13284 0.00799 
debt 0.16573 0.09041 
stdearnings 0.1009 0.0547 
litigation 0.19598 0 
substitution 0.15915 0.08591 
mktsize 0.15249 0.03272 
entrycost 0.16473 0.07393 
 
Panel B: Regression results for the tests of H1-H3 for the sample formed by coarsened 
exact matching 
Variables  lanacov car error 
inci  0.2576 0.00664 0.0134 
   (7.10) *** (2.90) *** (0.93) 
stdearnings  -0.0113 -6.62e-07  
  (-1.80) * (-0.18)  
tradingvol  0.0000502 2.24e-11  
  (0.18) (2.11) **  
beta  0.3739 0.00476  
  (9.40) *** (1.45)  
retvol  0.1358 0.2816 0.427 
  (0.43) (6.15) *** (2.11) ** 
price  -0.00138 -0.0000192 0.000302 
   (-7.65) *** (-0.53) (1.53) 
intangible  -0.2877 0.00501 -0.0189 
  (-1.12)  (0.41) (-0.63) 
regulated  0.2833 -0.00522  
  (1.40) (-0.37)  
size  0.4456 -0.00738 -0.0169 
    (23.77) *** (-5.79) *** (-2.93) *** 
btm  0.0285 0.000339 0.0612 
  (0.78) (0.12) (2.17) ** 
insti  0.413 0.001136  
    (2.83) *** (0.26)  
salesgrowth  0.000652 0.000104 -0.000035 
  (0.88) (3.18) *** (-0.50) 
capex  -0.0371 -0.000267 0.000598 
  (-1.54) (-0.25) (0.54) 
qtrret   -0.137 -0.00260 -0.0566 
     (-3.01) *** (-0.49) (-2.15) ** 
horizon    0.000499 
    (1.32) 
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abtradvol    0.0000257 
    (0.25) 
dedi    0.0800 
    (1.14) 
changeeps    -0.0498 
    (-2.00) ** 
constant  -1.616 0.0984 -0.0258 
    (-5.59) ***  (4.92) *** (-0.33) 
     
Observations  2885 2753 2314 
R-square  0.5873 0.2479 0.0830 
Notes: Panel A of Table 10 reports the L1 statistics of the covariates used in the regression that is run for coarsened 
exact matching. Panel B reports the regression results for the tests of H1-H3 that are done based on the coarsened-
exact-matched sample. The sample period is 2002-2012. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. Year and 
industry dummies are included in the regressions but not reported for simplicity. The industry dummies are 
constructed based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. p-values in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-
tailed), respectively. 
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 Appendix I  Summary of variable definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
lanacov The natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts that make at least one EPS 
forecast for a given firm for a fiscal year following the beginning of the third fiscal 
quarter. 
inci 
1 if a firm makes a product or business expansion disclosure over the first two fiscal 
quarters of a fiscal year; and 0 otherwise.  
car The three-day [-1,1] cumulative unsigned abnormal stock returns surrounding an 
analyst’s last forecast of EPS for a given firm for a fiscal year following the beginning 
of the third fiscal quarter. The abnormal stocks returns are calculated using a market 
model with an estimation period of [-181,-2] relative to the forecast date. If there are 
multiple analysts who make the EPS forecasts for the same firm, car is taken as the 
average of the abnormal returns associated with these forecasts. 
error The absolute difference between actual EPS and an analyst’s last forecast of EPS for 
a given firm for a fiscal year following the beginning of the third fiscal quarter, 
divided by the firm’s stock price. If there are multiple analysts making the EPS 
forecasts for the firm for a fiscal year following the beginning of the third fiscal 
quarter, the average is taken of the analysts’ last forecasts of EPS.  
retvol The standard deviation of daily market excess return over a 12-month period ending 
at the end of the second fiscal quarter of a given fiscal year.  
qtrret Buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of a given firm for the first two fiscal quarters 
for a given fiscal year. 
horizon The natural log of the number of days between analyst earnings forecast date and a 
firm’s earnings announcement date. 
tradingvol Dollar trading volume for a given firm for the first two fiscal quarters of a given fiscal 
year. 
abtravol Abnormal trading volume for a given firm for the first two fiscal quarters of a fiscal 
year, which is defined as dollar trading volume over the first two fiscal quarters in the 
current year minus dollar trading volume over the last two fiscal quarters in the prior 
year. 
btm The book value of firm equity divided by the market value of firm equity for a given 
firm at the beginning of a given fiscal year. 
price Stock price of a given firm at the end of the second fiscal quarter of a given fiscal 
year.  
size The natural logarithm of market value of a firm’s equity at the beginning of a given 
fiscal year. 
capex The sum of research and development expenses and advertisement expenses, divided 
by income before extraordinary items, for a given fiscal year.   
salesgrowth The difference between the sales for the current fiscal year and the sales for the 
previous year, divided by the sales for the previous year.  
insti Institutional investors’ stock ownership as a percentage of the total outstanding shares 
for a given firm at the beginning of the second fiscal quarter of a given fiscal year.  
beta Equity beta for a given firm for a given fiscal year. 
intangible Intangible assets divided by total assets for a firm at the end of a fiscal year. 
regulated 1 if a firm belongs to a regulated industry (SIC 4900-4999, 6000-6411, or 6500-6999) 
and 0 otherwise. 
dedi Dedicated institutional investors’ stock ownership as a percentage of the total 
outstanding shares for a firm at the beginning of the second fiscal quarter of a given 
fiscal year. 
stdearnings The standard deviation of income before extraordinary items for the previous five 
fiscal years.  
changeeps Annual EPS of a firm for the current fiscal year minus that for the previous year, 
divided by the firm’s stock price at the end of the fiscal year. 
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debt Long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of a given fiscal year. 
litigation  1 if a firm is in the biotechnology (2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (3570-
3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), and retail (5200-5961) industries; and 
0 otherwise. 
entrycost A proxy for proprietary costs of disclosures, which equals the average gross PPE for 
all firms in a 2-digit SIC industry for a fiscal year, weighted by each firm’s sales in 
the same industry (in millions of U.S. dollars). 
mktsize A proxy for proprietary costs of disclosures, which equals the sum of sales of all firms 
in a 2-digit SIC industry for a fiscal year (in millions of U.S. dollars). 
substitution A proxy for proprietary costs of disclosures, which equals the sum of operating costs 
of each firm in a 2-digit SIC industry for a fiscal year, divided by the sum of the sales 
of all firms in the same industry.  
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Appendix II  Results for propensity-score-matching specification 
 
Panel A: Determinants of the incidence of PBE disclosures for propensity score matching  
 
Variables inci  
capex 0.0265 
 (0.82)  
salesgrowth 0.00404 
 (1.92) * 
abtradvol 0.000406 
 (1.39)  
qtrret -0.1708 
 (-2.34) ** 
intangible 1.0361 
 (2.22)** 
size 0.2373 
 (8.18) *** 
btm -0.2439 
 (-2.76) *** 
debt -1.6115 
 (-4.82) *** 
stdearnings -0.0165 
 (-2.12) ** 
litigation 0.8352 
 (7.53) *** 
substitution -0.1587 
 (-1.32)  
mktsize 0.2398 
 (1.55)  
entrycost -5.7650 
 (-1.73)* 
Intercept -2.8073 
 (-10.23)*** 
  
Observations 15538 
Waldχ2 23.47 
Notes: Panel A reports the logistic regression result for the determinants of the incidence of PBE disclosures. The 
sample period is 2002-2012. The regression is run for the propensity score matching and involves the full sample of 
listed firm-years. The dependent variable, inci, equals 1 if a firm discloses a product or business expansion plan over 
the first two fiscal quarters; and 0 otherwise. All the other variables pertain to the determinants of the incidence of 
PBE disclosures and are defined in Appendix I. Year dummies are included in regressions but not reported for 
simplicity. p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 
5%, and 10% statistical significance levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics of PBE disclosure sample and non-PBE disclosure sample formed by 
propensity score matching 
 
Variables Mean 
inci=0 (N=1392) 
Mean 
inci=1 (N=1392) 
Mean difference 
(t-stat) 
Standardized bias 
(%) 
capex 0.0630 0.0217 0.0413 
(1.4325) 
-5.43  
salesgrowth 0.3843 0.1875 0.1967 
(1.4124) 
-5.33 
abtradvol 2.4052 1.3040 1.1012 
(0.7268) 
-2.75  
qtrret 0.0313 0.0349 -0.0036 
(-0.2765) 
1.05  
intangible 0.0220 0.0210 0.0011 
(0.3152) 
-1.12  
size 6.7899 6.9105 -0.1206 
(-1.6946) * 
6.39  
btm 0.5548 0.5859 -0.0311 
(-1.5561) 
5.88  
debt 0.0787 0.0834 -0.0047 
(-0.9077) 
3.42  
stdearnings 3.0698 1.8083 1.2615 
(2.6842) *** 
-10.18  
litigation 0.3707 0.3635 0.0072 
(0.3931) 
-1.45  
substitution 1.1586 1.1493 0.0093 
(1.3962) 
-5.67  
mktsize 0.3454 0.3224 0.0229 
(1.3313) 
-5.06  
entrycost 0.0129 0.0128 0.0000 
(0.0030) 
-0.44  
Note: Panel B reports descriptive statistics of the covariates in the PBE disclosure sample (inci=1) and non-PBE 
disclosure sample (inci=0) that are formed based on the propensity score matching. Specifically, the results for the 
two-sample tests of mean and standardized bias are provided. All the variables are defined in Appendix I. ***, **, 
* denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed tests), respectively.  
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Appendix III  Examples of product and business expansion plan disclosures 
 
1. An example of product information plan --- American Express Introduces New Online and 
Mobile Payment Security Services 
 
“New York, November 3, 2014: American Express today announced the launch of its American 
Express Token Service, a suite of solutions designed to enable its card-issuing partners, processors, 
acquirers and merchants to create a safer online and mobile payments environment for consumers. 
With American Express Token Service, traditional card account numbers are replaced with unique 
"tokens," which can then be used to complete payment transactions online, in a mobile app or in-store 
with a mobile Near Field Communication (NFC)-enabled device. By using tokens, merchants and 
digital wallet operators will no longer need to store consumers' sensitive payment account information 
in their systems. In addition, tokens can be assigned for use with a specific merchant, transaction type 
or payment device to provide further protection against fraud. 
Based on EMVCo's Payment Tokenization Specification and Technical Framework published 
earlier this year, American Express Token Service offers the following features: (i) a token vault to store 
and map tokens to card account numbers; (ii) the ability to issue tokens; (iii) lifecycle management 
services to create, suspend, resume or delete tokens; (iv) additional fraud and risk management services, 
such as authorization and payment data validation capabilities, for card-issuing financial institutions. 
American Express Token Service is available in the U.S., and international rollout is expected to 
begin in 2015. 
“We believe our payments network is a tremendous asset to American Express – one that will allow 
us to offer our customers new features and technologies to meet their evolving spending needs," said 
Paul Fabara, President, Global Banking and Global Network Business, American Express.  "As we 
move ahead, we are excited to bring these new capabilities to our customers and look forward to 
continuing to serve them." 
American Express also announced that it has developed network specifications for Host Card 
Emulation (HCE).  American Express' HCE specifications provide its card-issuing partners with 
additional security options and solutions for payments made with mobile NFC-enabled devices that 
support Android iOS KitKat. With HCE, card issuers use a secure cloud server to store their customers' 
card account details, which can be transmitted from the cloud server to an NFC-enabled mobile device 
and then to a Point-of-Sale terminal in a fast, secure manner. American Express' HCE specifications 
are available today globally." 
 
(Source: Press release from American Express, available at 
http://about.americanexpress.com/news/pr/2014/amex-intros-online-mobile-payment-security.aspx) 
 
2. An example of business expansion plan --- Apple Invests €1.7 Billion in New European Data 
Centres 
 
“CORK, Ireland --- February 23, 2015: Apple today announced a €1.7 billion plan to build and 
operate two data centres in Europe, each powered by 100 percent renewable energy. The facilities, 
located in County Galway, Ireland, and Denmark’s central Jutland, will power Apple’s online services 
including the iTunes Store, App Store, iMessage, Maps and Siri for customers across Europe. 
“We are grateful for Apple’s continued success in Europe and proud that our investment supports 
communities across the continent,” said Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO. “This significant new investment 
represents Apple’s biggest project in Europe to date. We’re thrilled to be expanding our operations, 
creating hundreds of local jobs and introducing some of our most advanced green building designs yet." 
Apple supports nearly 672,000 European jobs, including 530,000 jobs directly related to the 
development of iOS apps. Since the App Store’s debut in 2008, developers across Europe have earned 
more than €6.6 billion through the worldwide sale of apps. 
    Apple now directly employs 18,300 people across 19 European countries and has added over 2,000 
jobs in the last 12 months alone. Last year, Apple spent more than €7.8 billion with European companies 
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and suppliers helping build Apple products and support operations around the world. 
    Like all Apple data centres, the new facilities will run entirely on clean, renewable energy sources 
from day one. Apple will also work with local partners to develop additional renewable energy projects 
from wind or other sources to provide power in the future. These facilities will have the lowest 
environmental impact yet for an Apple data centre. 
   “We believe that innovation is about leaving the world better than we found it, and that the time for 
tackling climate change is now,” said Lisa Jackson, Apple’s vice president of Environmental Initiatives.    
“We’re excited to spur green industry growth in Ireland and Denmark and develop energy systems that 
take advantage of their strong wind resources. Our commitment to environmental responsibility is good 
for the planet, good for our business and good for the European economy." 
    The two data centres, each measuring 166,000 square metres, are expected to begin operations in 
2017 and include designs with additional benefits for their communities. For the project in Athenry, 
Ireland, Apple will recover land previously used for growing and harvesting non-native trees and restore 
native trees to Derrydonnell Forest. The project will also provide an outdoor education space for local 
schools, as well as a walking trail for the community. 
    In Viborg, Denmark, Apple will eliminate the need for additional generators by locating the data 
centre adjacent to one of Denmark’s largest electrical substations. The facility is also designed to 
capture excess heat from equipment inside the facility and conduct it into the district heating system to 
help warm homes in the neighbouring community. 
   Apple designs Macs, the best personal computers in the world, along with OS X, iLife, iWork and 
professional software. Apple leads the digital music revolution with its iPods and iTunes online store. 
Apple has reinvented the mobile phone with its revolutionary iPhone and App Store, and is defining the 
future of mobile media and computing devices with iPad." 
 
(Source: Press release from Apple, available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2015/02/23Apple-to-
Invest-1-7-Billion-in-New-European-Data-Centres.html) 
 
3. An example of a product information plan --- Model X Wins the Golden Steering Wheel 
 
“The Tesla Team --- November 8, 2016: Today, we are truly honored to announce that Model X has 
been awarded the Golden Steering Wheel (Das Goldene Lenkrad), one of the most prestigious 
automotive awards in the world. Candidates for this award are nominated by hundreds of thousands 
across Europe for excellence across six categories. The Golden Steering Wheel jury, composed of 
professional race car drivers, accomplished technicians, editors, designers, and digital and 
connectivity experts, then spent three days judging Model X. 
This excellence did not come without its share of challenges early on. Model X is a complex vehicle 
to build, and its advanced feature set introduced some obstacles as we ramped production in early 2016. 
In the months since, we have introduced significant updates to make Model X an even better car. Most 
of these refinements have rolled out as over-the-air software updates, which enhance each vehicle 
regardless of when it was built. For the small number of improvements that are hardware-related, 
changes have rolled out to our early owners via priority Tesla Service. We have implemented those 
same changes in our factory immediately, because we do not believe in waiting for the next model year 
to introduce improvements to our cars. 
As a result of this continuous improvement, Model X owners have seen a 92% reduction in 
reliability concerns over the past year. Nearly 20,000 owners are now experiencing the quickest, 
smartest, and safest SUV ever, with more than 90% of owners saying they would buy Model X again. 
Here are some of the ways Model X has become better over time: 
Falcon Wing Doors: (i)2x improvement in door sensor object detection; (ii) 25% improvement 
in opening/closing speed; (iii) Dynamic profile adjustment to indoor mode when roof sensor detects a 
low ceiling; (iv) 83% reduction in customer-reported issues with door opening/closing 
Powered front doors and remote keyless entry: (i) Refined keyfob detection for smart automatic 
front door behavior as you approach, enter, or leave the car; (ii) 8x improvement in keyfob battery life; 
automated alert from the car if the battery gets low; (iii) Several improvements to power front door 
movement and latching system, leading to 51% reduction in door issues and improved performance on 
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hills; (iv) Wind noise customer-reported issues reduced by 22% with a combination of hardware 
modifications and fit/finish improvements 
Interior Temperature Management: (i) Introduced Cabin Overheat Protection by managing the 
maximum interior temperature of Model X through software; (ii) Improved HVAC performance by 
increasing maximum fan speed with an over-the-air software update 
Second row seats: (i) Multiple over-the-air updates have enhanced seat motion, obstacle 
detection, pitch calibration, and usability; (ii) Software enhancements have added intelligent behaviors 
between seats, adjusting spacing differently, for example, depending on which rows are occupied 
Infotainment System: (i) Touchscreen and Bluetooth connectivity improvements via over-the-air 
software update; (ii) Largest user interface overhaul since the launch of Model S in over-the-
air Software 8.0 rollout 
Our commitment is to be best-in-class in safety, performance, comfort, and reliability in all of our 
vehicles. Model X is no exception. As we continue to accelerate the advent of sustainable energy, we 
invite you to visit one of our showrooms or request a stop from a Tesla mobile Design Studio near you.” 
 
(Source: Press release from Tesla, available at: https://www.tesla.com/en_GB/blog/model-x-wins-
golden-steering-wheel) 
 
4 An example of a business expansion plan --- Battery Cell Production Begins at the Gigafactory 
 
“The Tesla Team --- January 4, 2017:Tesla’s mission is to accelerate the world’s transition to 
sustainable energy through increasingly affordable electric vehicles in addition to renewable energy 
generation and storage. At the heart of these products are batteries. Today at the Gigafactory, Tesla 
and Panasonic begin mass production of lithium-ion battery cells, which will be used in Tesla’s energy 
storage products and Model 3. 
The high performance cylindrical “2170 cell” was jointly designed and engineered by Tesla and 
Panasonic to offer the best performance at the lowest production cost in an optimal form factor for both 
electric vehicles and energy products. 
Production of 2170 cells for qualification started in December and today, production begins on 
cells that will be used in Tesla’s Powerwall 2 and Powerpack 2 energy products. Model 3 cell 
production will follow in Q2 and by 2018, the Gigafactory will produce 35 GWh/year of lithium-ion 
battery cells, nearly as much as the rest of the entire world’s battery production combined.  
The Gigafactory is being built in phases so that Tesla, Panasonic, and other partners can begin 
manufacturing immediately inside the finished sections and continue to expand thereafter. Our phased 
approach also allows us to learn and continuously improve our construction and operational 
techniques as we continue to drive down the cost of energy storage. Already, the current structure has 
a footprint of 1.9 million square feet, which houses 4.9 million square feet of operational space across 
several floors. And we are still less than 30 percent done. Once complete, we expect the Gigafactory to 
be the biggest building in the world. 
With the Gigafactory online and ramping up production, our cost of battery cells will significantly 
decline due to increasing automation and process design to enhance yield, lowered capital investment 
per unit of production, the simple optimization of locating most manufacturing processes under one 
roof, and economies of scale. By bringing down the cost of batteries, we can make our products 
available to more and more people, allowing us to make the biggest possible impact on transitioning 
the world to sustainable energy. 
Finally, bringing cell production to the U.S. allows us to create thousands of American jobs. In 
2017 alone, Tesla and Panasonic will hire several thousand local employees and at peak production, 
the Gigafactory will directly employ 6,500 people and indirectly create between 20,000 to 30,000 
additional jobs in the surrounding regions.” 
 
(Source: Press release from Tesla, available at: https://www.tesla.com/en_GB/blog/battery-cell-
production-begins-gigafactory) 
 
